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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether firms in industries with a more mobile labor force engage in less earnings 
management to reduce expected separation costs stemming from labor turnover. Employing an 
occupation-based measure of labor mobility for a large sample of US firms, we that labor 
mobility is negatively related to several measures of accrual-based and real earnings 
management. This relation is stronger if labor is more important for value creation in the industry 
and if the product market competition is more intense in the industry. Moreover, labor mobility 
is more strongly related to earnings management if firms face financial constraints. We also 
employ exogenous variation in worker mobility across states to alleviate endogeneity concerns. 
Overall, we show that employees have a significant impact on firm’s earnings management 
activities. 
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1. Introduction  
For most firms, labor accounts for the largest part of their annual costs. The labor force is 
an important source of value for firms, which is recognized by both firms and their capital 
providers (Lajili and Zéghal, 2006). However, employees work for firms at their own will and 
can choose to move between employers, subject to limited restrictions. Recent literature in labor 
economics provides empirical evidence that the costs associated with voluntary labor turnover 
are substantial, as new workers need to be recruited and trained. Labor turnover can also lead to 
disruptions in the organizational routine and to a loss of social capital, both of which have been 
linked to declining performance (Hale et al., 2016; Shaw et al., 2005). In the U.S., the cost to 
firms of employee separation has been estimated to be more than 100% of the annual wage for 
qualified employees and the cost of hiring new employees is considered to be even higher (Nase 
2009). Hence, firms have strong incentives to reduce labor turnover to minimize these costs.  
Employees choose to work for an employer based on their confidence in its ability to 
avoid default and honor its future explicit and implicit contracts (Cahuc et al., 2014). 
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show analytically that a firm will reduce leverage to increase 
stakeholders' confidence in its ability to avoid default and honor its contracts, when the relation 
with the stakeholders is an important one for the firm. Consistently, Bae et al. (2011) find that 
firms caring about their employees borrow less. Job security is especially important when the 
cost of unemployment is high and accordingly Agrawal and Matsa (2013) show that firms’ 
leverage is affected by employees’ unemployment benefits. Finally, recent empirical evidence 
shows that employees are leaving firms if they are close to financial distress (Baghai et al., 2017) 
and are not willing to join financially constrained ones (Brown and Matsa, 2016).  
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We study earnings management as another mechanism affecting employees’ confidence 
in a firm’s ability to honor employment contracts in the future and reduce firms expected 
separation costs. Employees, as insiders, are able to detect misreporting and earnings 
management (Dyck et al. 2010) and are greatly concerned about their employers’ viability. Past 
accounting literature has produced evidence that earnings management negatively affects future 
performance. For example, Hutton et al. (2009) find that in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period, 
accrual earnings management is positively related to stock price crashes; while Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004) and Kravet and Shevlin (2010) show that accounting restatements are associated 
with lower future expected earnings and increase the firm’s cost of capital.  
Employees’ ability to move between employers (i.e. labor mobility) is determined by the 
overall demand for their skills in the economy. Research in labor economics shows that these 
skills are defined at the occupation level. Labor mobility increases the likelihood of voluntary 
labor turnover and hence increases the expected separation costs to firms. Consistent with this 
intuition, Donangelo (2014) shows that firms with a highly mobile labor force have a lower 
elasticity of wages to industry shocks. Accordingly, we expect that firms with a highly mobile 
labor force will be less likely to engage in earnings management activities to increase 
employees’ confidence in the viability of the firm and avoid potential labor separation costs. 
For our empirical analysis, we follow prior literature on labor economics and measure 
mobility at the occupation level, as the flexibility of an occupation to be employed in different 
industries (Grossman and Shapiro, 1982; Donangelo, 2014). We then calculate the workforce 
mobility of an industry as the weighted average of the occupations it employs. Using this 
measure for a large sample of US firms from 1990 to 2013, we show that employees’ mobility is 
negatively related to various measures of earnings management, suggesting that firms use their 
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financial reporting as a means to reassure employees of their future prospects. To help validate 
our inference, we examine cross-sectional variation in the importance of labor for value creation 
of the firm. We find that when firms operate in industries where labor is more important this 
relation is stronger. We also find that this relation is stronger in industries which face strong 
product market competition. This is in line with the intuition that workers are more concerned 
about the future prospects of their firm if competition is fierce, because financial distress is more 
likely in competitive industries. Finally, we show that labor mobility is more strongly related to 
earnings management if the firm is financially constrained. The risk of financial distress is higher 
for financially constrained firms, and hence employees are more worried about future firm 
performance. 
The analysis described above is based on an industry-level measure of labor mobility and 
hence omitted variables at the industry level might bias our findings. In order to better provide a 
causal interpretation of our findings we exploit a plausibly exogenous change in labor mobility. 
Specifically, we use changes in state-level real estate transfer taxes when private property is sold 
as well as state-level residential real estate prices to capture differences in individuals’ 
willingness to re-locate. These measures of labor mobility are exogenous and uncorrelated with 
specific occupations or industries and are not directly related to firms accounting policies. The 
additional analysis verifies our main results, emphasizing that firms adjust their accounting 
policies in line with their labor force characteristics.  
Our work contributes to at least two different streams of literature. First, we contribute to 
the accounting literature examining labor relationships as an incentive for earnings management. 
Prior literature has studied how remuneration and job security concerns of managers affect 
earnings management (e.g. Healy 1985; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). Studies examining 
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earnings management and rank-and-file employees heavily concentrates on employees’ 
unionization (e.g. Liberty and Zimmerman 1986; García Osma et al. 2015; Hamm et al. 2013). 
With unionization decreasing over time, however, additional research is needed on how other 
characteristics of the labor force affect earnings management practices. The two most recent 
studies related to our work are Dou et al. (2016) and Call et al. (2017). Dou et al. (2016) find that 
accrual quality and the likelihood of income decreasing reporting choices increase after an 
increase in the state unemployment insurance benefits. However, unemployment insurance 
benefits should only be relevant for a small part of the workforce and the overall magnitude is 
small. Call et al. (2017) show that employees’ education level is positively related to accrual 
quality and negatively related to internal control violations and restatements. They argue that 
better educated employees produce better accounting numbers. We extend their work by 
studying earnings management as a mechanism that affects employees’ confidence in the firms’ 
ability to honor employment contracts in the future. 
 Second, we contribute to the finance and economics literature examining the effects of 
labor mobility on corporate decisions. Mobile employees have more valuable outside options and 
are, hence, more likely to change employers. Recent research in finance and economics shows 
that this affects firms’ financial policies. We extend this stream of research by showing that 
workforce characteristics also influence financial reporting practices. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes relevant prior literature and 
presents our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the measurement of our main variables and 
describes our research design and sample. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis 
and section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Firm and employee separation costs 
Employee turnover either due to quitting or firing (hereafter ‘separation’) can result in 
significant gross and net adjustment costs for firms (Hamermesh 1993). Examples of gross 
adjustment costs include termination payments to departing employees, searching for new 
employees, direct costs of hiring and training new employees. On the other hand, net adjustment 
costs are defined as the costs that arise when moving to new levels of employment such as 
changes in the employees’ morale and reorganization costs. In the US, the cost of employee 
separation is estimated to be between 25% and more than 100% of the annual wage for less and 
highly qualified employees respectively; while the costs of hiring new employees are considered 
to be even higher (Nase 2009). 
Separation is also expensive for employees. Couch and Placzek (2010) find that displaced 
workers lose immediately about one third of their earnings, although the magnitude of the loss 
can vary depending on the characteristics of the individual, the jurisdiction of employment, and 
the macro-economic environment (Jacobson et al. 1993; and Davis and Von Watcher 2011). Job 
loss has further been found to negatively affect health, mortality rates, and education of children 
(see Davis and von Watcher 2011).  Employees that willingly leave a firm to look for job 
elsewhere might also be negatively affected as not all of them move directly to another employer 
(Polsky 1999); and even if they do, they might lose their tenure premium (Topel 1991). 
Consistent with separation costs being important for both employees and employers, prior 
literature has found that employees of risky firms receive a higher salary (e.g. Brown and Matsa 
2016; Peters and Wagner 2014) and, further, that firms which depend more on their reputation 
7 
 
with employees have on average lower leverage ratios (e.g. Maksimovic and Titman 1991; Bae 
et al. 2011; Agrawal and Matsa 2013). High mobility of employees, defined as their “flexibility 
to move in and out of the industry” (Donangelo 2014, p. 1322) can decrease their separation 
costs. Mobile employees are more likely to have highly valuable outside options as the pool of 
potential new jobs is significantly larger for them. At the same time labor mobility increases 
firms’ separation costs as quits are more likely, especially in bad times (Baghai et al. 2017). 
Hence, mobility increases employees’ negotiating power, and one would expect that the higher 
the mobility of a firm’s labor, the lower the firm’s financial leverage and the higher the wage 
premium employees demand.  Indeed, some recent papers empirically demonstrate this 
prediction. Specifically, Donangelo (2014) shows that firms with highly mobile labor force have 
a lower elasticity of wages to industry shocks, consistent with a labor induced form of operating 
leverage through higher separation cost; and Sanati (2017) finds that firms with mobile labor 
force have lower financial leverage and also invest less. 
2.2. Earnings management and firm performance 
Accounting quality in general and accrual quality in particular have been associated with 
investors’ assessment of firm risk and performance. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) and Kravet and 
Shevlin (2010) show that restatements increase the cost of capital.  Francis et al. (2005) 
demonstrate that accrual quality as determined by both the nature of operations and managerial 
manipulation is negatively associated with the cost of capital.  Bharath et al. (2008) find that high 
abnormal accruals restrict the firm’s access to public debt, increase its cost of debt and also 
affect the provisions of covenants in its debt contracts.    
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To the extent that accruals reverse, current positive abnormal accruals should foretell 
negative future accruals and hence lower reported future earnings. Indeed, Barton and Simko 
(2002), measuring accumulated prior year accruals by contrasting net assets and sales, show that 
manipulating accounting accruals today limits managers’ ability to manipulate accruals in the 
future in order to meet/beat analysts’ earnings forecasts.   Consistently, Hutton et al. (2009) find 
that in the pre- Sarbanes-Oxley Act period abnormal accruals are positively related to stock price 
crashes. Teoh et al. (1998) find that IPO issuers with abnormal accruals have a lower three-year 
stock return than their peers; Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find that accounting restatements are 
negatively related to analysts’ forecasts of future earnings; and Louis (2004) provide evidence 
that the post-merger underperformance anomaly can be explained by the reversal of pre-merger 
abnormal accruals and the market’s initial under-reaction. In addition, Biddle and Hilary (2006) 
find that low accrual quality decreases investment efficiency which in turn negatively affects the 
long-term performance of the firm. 
While earnings management studies traditionally focus on the relation between accrual 
management and performance, recently more studies examine the effect of real activities 
earnings management. In contrast to accrual management which is merely a manipulation of the 
accounting representation of certain transactions, real earnings management refers to “the 
departure from normal operational practices” (Roychowdhury 2006, p. 337) and could 
significantly affect the firms’ actual cash flows. Cohen et al. (2008) show that real earnings 
management activities increased after the passage of SOX while accruals earnings management 
decreased. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that real earnings management, performed before 
seasonal equity offerings (SEOs), is more strongly related to post – SEO operating 
underperformance compared to accruals management; and Chan et al. (2014) show that 
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substituting accrual earnings management with real earnings management to avoid managerial 
compensation penalties temporarily increases operating and stock performance but this increase 
reverses in the near future. Lastly, Bereskin et al. (2016) show that real earnings management, in 
the form of discretionary R&D cuts, is linked to lower innovative efficiency, which signifies 
lower future prospects. 
Importantly, real earnings management is often achieved through activities that are more 
apparent to employees, such as cutting research and development expenditures, reducing 
marketing, or overproducing inventory.  Unlike accrual-based management, rank and file 
employees would be able to detect unusual real earnings management without actually reviewing 
any financial reports.  To the extent that employees sense that firms are taking actions to mask 
actual operating performance, it might cause them to reevaluate the employer’s ability to honor 
its explicit and implicit commitments, and cause them to seek employment elsewhere. 
2.3. Employees and accounting policies 
Accounting research on incentives for earnings management has mainly focused on 
incentives driven by political costs and the debt and equity capital needs of firms, largely 
ignoring incentives linked to other stakeholders such as employees. Even when employees are 
considered as a motivating factor for earnings management, in the majority of the cases, the 
focus is on high-ranking employees, i.e. executives, or labor unions.  
Prior literature has provided evidence that managers manipulate earnings to maximize 
their compensation - which can be linked to both accounting earnings (Healy 1985; Gaver et al. 
1995; and Holthausen et al. 1995) and to market prices (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) - or to 
secure their job (DeAngelo 1988). Prior literature has also examined earnings management 
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around negotiations with labor unions but has yet to reach a unanimous conclusion (see for 
example Liberty and Zimmerman 1986; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991; García Osma et al. 
2015). However, the consensus is stronger with regards to the effect of unionized labor on 
accounting practices overall. D’Souza et al. (2000) find that the more unionized its work force, 
the more likely it is that a firm will recognize a higher pension liability under SFAS 106. Hamm 
et al. (2017) show that the strength of labor unions is positively related to income smoothing; and 
lastly Bova (2013) shows that unionized firms are more likely to miss earnings targets set by 
equity analysts.   
Recent accounting research examines the other characteristics of the labor force and labor 
regulations as a determinant of firms’ accounting practices. Namely, Call et al. (2017) study how 
the education level of employees affect reporting outcomes and find the former to be positively 
related with accrual quality and negatively related with internal control violations and 
restatements. They attribute their findings to the fact that highly educated employees provide 
higher quality input to the accounting system of the firms and also are in a better position to 
uncover inconsistencies before statements are published. However, they remain silent as to 
employees’ incentives and financial reporting preferences. Likewise, Dou et al. (2016) find that 
accrual quality and the likelihood of income decreasing reporting choices increase after an 
increase in the state unemployment insurance benefits. Dou et al. (2016) attribute their findings 
to lower shareholders-employees conflict due to lower costs of unemployment for employees. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
Firms’ financial position is a key determinant of their workforce flow (Falato and Liang 
2016; and Graham et al. 2005). Findings of prior research on labor economics are consistent with 
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employees being conscious of the relationship between the firm’s financial position and their 
employment prospects, adjusting accordingly the supply of labor and their wage differential. For 
example, Brown and Matsa (2016) survey individuals seeking jobs through an online platform 
and find a strong correlation between their perception of firms’ performance and actual firm 
performance, measured by return on assets as well as credit default swap prices. They interpret 
this finding as evidence that job seekers have enough information to accurately evaluate the 
financial position of potential employers. Brown and Matsa (2016), further, find a negative 
relationship between firms’ financial position and the number as well as the quality of job 
applicants. 
Manipulation of accounting earnings can be seen as a sign of weakness, as it has been 
associated with lower future performance. For example, Barton and Simko (2002) show that 
manipulation of accruals negatively influences the ability of managers to meet future earnings 
targets; Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find that accounting restatements are negatively related to 
analysts’ forecasts of future earnings; and Hutton et al. (2009) find that abnormal accruals are 
positively related to future stock price crashes.  For employees to be able to influence the level of 
earnings management performed by firms, in addition to recognizing its impact on future 
performance, they should also be in a position to either identify earnings management activities, 
or be expected to respond negatively to ex-post revelations of earnings management. Consistent 
with their ability to detect earnings managment, Dyck et al. (2010) find that employees are major 
whistle-blowers for corporate fraud, even more important than investors, regulators and auditors. 
Consequently, firms have incentives to provide high quality financial statements in order 
to reduce separation costs. The more mobile the firm’s employees, the higher the expected 
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separation costs for the firm and the stronger the incentives against accrual earnings 
management.  Hence, our first hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
 
H1: Labor mobility is negatively related to accrual-based earnings management. 
 
The level of earnings management in each firm is the result of an unobserved trade-off 
decision process. Specifically, apart from the potential positive effects that low levels of earnings 
management could have on expected future performance and the consequence reduction in 
separation costs, it could at the same time lead to the loss of short-term market profits linked to 
meeting/beating earnings benchmarks, etc. (Gunny 2010).  The benefits of lower earnings 
management, in the form of lower expected separation costs, are more likely to outweigh any 
potential costs when labor capital is important for a firm. Hence, our second hypothesis can be 
stated as follows: 
 
H2: The negative relation between labor mobility and accrual earnings management is 
more pronounced in industries where labor capital is more important. 
 
Similarly, expected separation costs and disincentives to manage earnings are stronger for 
financially constrained firms compared to financially healthy firms. Garmaise (2007) shows, 
both theoretically and empirically, that labor capital is relatively more important for financially 
constrained firms because employees, as insiders, are more likely to provide efficient financing 
compared to outside capital providers. Moreover, he shows that financially constrained firms 
have difficulty attracting new employees. Accordingly, we expect that retaining employees is 
more important for financially constrained firms, and we state our third hypothesis as follows: 
 
H3: The negative relation between labor mobility and accrual earnings management is 
more pronounced for financially constrained firms. 
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Further, we expect that the relationship between labor mobility and earnings management 
varies across industries with different degrees of product market competition. Firms in 
competitive industries are less likely to absorb external shocks and are therefore more likely to 
be in financial distress. In line with this argument, Valta (2012) shows that firms in competitive 
industries face higher cost of debt. Given that employees realize the higher likelihood of 
financial distress the expected separation costs are higher for the employees in competitive 
industries and hence the higher the incentives for the firm to reduce earnings management. 
Accordingly, we state our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
 
H4: The negative relation between labor mobility and accrual earnings management is 
more pronounced in in industries with strong product market competition. 
 
 
Real earnings management has been shown to adversely affect firms’ long-term 
performance. For example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that earnings management is related 
to post – SEO operating underperformance and that the relation is stronger for real earnings 
management compared to accrual earnings management. Accordingly, we argue that similar to 
accruals earnings management, firms have incentives to reduce separations costs by avoiding 
real earnings management. The more mobile the firm’s employees, the higher the expected 
separation costs for the firm and the stronger the incentives against real earnings management.  
Hence, our fifth hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
 
H5: Labor mobility is negatively related to real earnings management. 
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3. Research design and sample 
3.1. Labor mobility 
The flexibility workers have to move between jobs is determined by the skills offered by 
an individual and demanded by an industry and is a-priori unobservable. In order to construct a 
measure of mobility we build on the labor economics literature that shows that workers skills are 
largely captured by their occupation (e.g. Grossman and Shapiro, 1982). Kambourov and 
Manovskii (2009) and Sullivan (2010) show that specific skills are more linked to an occupation 
than to an industry. We therefore expect workers in occupations that are represented in many 
industries to move easier between jobs as they can find employment across a wide range of 
industries.  Following Donangelo (2014), we first measure the mobility of an occupation by the 
dispersion of the occupation across industries. We calculate the inter-industry concentration of 
occupation j at time t as follows: 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ (
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑖
)
2
𝑖
, 
where empi,j,t is the number of workers assigned to occupation j in industry i at time t. 
Occupations which are highly (lowly) concentrated correspond to industries with low (high) 
labor mobility. We collect information on occupational assignments across industries from the 
Occupational Employment Survey (OES) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from 
1988 to 2013. This dataset is based on annual surveys of approximately 200,000 establishments 
across a wide range of industries and covers approximately 60% of U.S. non-farm employment. 
The OES classifies employment occupations across 444 broad occupations using the Standard 
Occupation Classification (SOC). Industries are classified using three-digit SIC codes before 
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2001 and four-digit NAICS codes afterwards. Table 1, Panel A shows the occupations with the 
highest and lowest mobility. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In the second step, we measure the mobility of an industries’ labor force as the average mobility 
of the occupations it employs. We weight each occupation by its annual median wage to 
incorporate its relative importance. The labor force mobility of industry i at time t is calculated 
as follows: 
𝑀𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = (∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑗,𝑡𝑗
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 × 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 × 𝑖 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
)
−1
, 
where wagei,j,t is the median annual wage for workers in industry i assigned to occupation j at 
time t. We invert our measure so that higher (lower) values correspond to higher (lower) labor 
mobility. Information on wages is available from the OES from 1997 onwards; before this date 
we use information from the Current Population Survey (CPS) of the Census Bureau. Some 
occupations that require relatively little specific preparation are unlikely to be relevant in our 
setting. We therefore exclude occupations that require no or only little preparations. To identify 
these occupations, we use the Specific Vocational Preparation (SVP) measure from the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) in its 1991 version. We follow the Occupational 
Information Network Job Zone’s methodology and drop occupations with SVP levels below 
four. Table 1, Panel B shows the industries with the highest and lowest mobile labor force. 
Donangelo (2014) shows that this measure of labor mobility is associated with ex-post worker 
flows providing evidence for the validity of the measure. Finally, we standardize our measure on 
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an annual basis by subtracting the mean and dividing it by the standard deviation because we are 
mainly interested in variations across industries and less in variations across time. 
3.2. Earnings management 
3.2.1. Accruals earnings management  
We use a cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals to measure a firm’s earnings 
management activities. Our primary model is the modified Jones (1991) model as described in 
Dechow et al. (1995). More specifically, we estimate the following model for each two-digit 
SIC-year: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1,𝑡
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2,𝑡
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
 
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TA represents total accruals defined as EXBIi,t – CFOi,t, 
Assetsi,t represents total assets, REVi,t represents the change in revenues from the preceding year 
and PPEi,t represents the gross value of property, plant and equipment. The coefficient estimates 
from equation (1) are used to estimate the firm-specific normal accruals (NAi,t) for each firm: 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂?1,𝑡
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2,𝑡
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?3,𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
, 
where ARi,t represents the change in accounts receivable from the preceding year. Following the 
previous we estimate the industry-specific regression using the change in revenues but adjust the 
revenues for the change in accounts receivable to capture any potential accounting discretion 
arising from credit sales. Finally, we measure discretionary accruals as the absolute value of the 
difference between total accruals and predicted normal accruals, i.e. DAi,t=|TAi,t – NAit|. We use 
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the absolute value because we do not condition on specific firm events and accruals reverse over 
time (Cohen et al., 2008).  
3.2.2. Real earnings management 
We follow prior literature and calculate two measures for real earnings management 
activities. Our primary model is based on Roychowdhury (2006) and considers the abnormal 
levels of cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses and production costs. These proxies 
capture the acceleration of the timing of sales through increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms, reporting of lower cost of goods sold through increased production, and decreases 
in discretionary expenses including advertising, R&D and SG&A expenses. More specifically, 
we estimate the following three models for each two-digit SIC-year group:  
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1,𝑡
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (3) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1,𝑡
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘4,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (4) 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑘1,𝑡
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (5) 
where CFOi,t represents the cash flow from operations, PRODi,t represents the production costs 
defined as the sum of costs of goods sold and the change in inventories, and DISXi,t represents 
the discretionary expenditures defined as sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses and 
SG&A. We measure the abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses as the difference between the actual values and the values predicted from equations (3)-
(5), respectively. Finally, we follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and combine these three 
measures to compute two comprehensive metrics to capture the total effects of real earnings 
management. For our first measure, we first multiply abnormal discretionary expenses by 
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negative one and add it to abnormal production cost (REM1). For our second measure, we 
multiply abnormal cash flows from operations by negative one and add abnormal discretionary 
expenses, again multiplied by negative one (REM2). Higher (lower) for both metrics correspond 
to more (less) real earnings management. 
3.3. Research design 
We test our hypotheses by estimating a cross-sectional model including our test variables 
as well as a number of control variables that are related to a firm’s labor force or have been 
shown to affect earnings management in previous literature. More specifically, we estimate the 
following model by OLS: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑖𝑔 4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 (6) 
where Earnings Managementi,t is one of our measures of earnings management, i.e. absolute 
value of abnormal accruals or one of our two real earnings management metrics, Mobilityi,t is the 
measure of labor mobility defined in section 3.1, Unioni,t is the percentage of unionized workers 
in the industry, Labor Intensityi,t is the ratio of number of employees to property, plant and 
equipment, Employeesi,t is the natural logarithm of the number of employees, High Skilli,t is the 
percentage of occupations requiring specific vocational preparation in the industry, Sizei,t is the 
natural logarithm of total assets, Industry Growthi,t is the percentage growth in sales in the 
industry from the previous year, Agei,t is the age of the firm proxied by the natural logarithm of 
the number of years the firm appears in Compustat, Cash Flowi,t is the cash flow from operating 
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activities, Big 4 Auditori,t is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is audited by one of the 
four largest audit firms and zero otherwise, Leveragei,t is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets, MTBi,t is the ratio market value of equity to book value of equity and t are year fixed 
effects. As labor mobility is measured at the three-digit SIC/four-digit NAICS code and our 
earnings management measures are calculated based on predicted values based on regressions at 
the two-digit SIC code level, we exploit variations in labor mobility within two-digit SIC codes.  
3.4. Sample 
We collect financial information from Compustat for the years 1991 to 2013. Information 
on unionization across industries is obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage 
Database from the CPS (see Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) for details). Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix 1. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels to limit 
the possible effect of outliers. The descriptive statistics of our sample are shown in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Union coverage in our sample is on average 10%, however it is decreasing from an average of 
14% in 1991 to only 8% in 2013 in line with previous research (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003). 
This reinforces the necessity to move beyond unionization to study the implications of labor 
force’s relationships to firms accounting policies. The Pearson correlation coefficients are shown 
in Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Accrual earnings management 
Our results for testing hypothesis 1 are shown in Table 4. We find a significant negative 
effect of labor mobility on the absolute value of discretionary accruals. An increase in labor 
mobility of one standard deviation increases the absolute accruals by 0.005 in our sample, which 
corresponds to a decrease of approximately 4%. Results on control variables are similar to 
previous research.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
We next study the impact of labor mobility across industries to test our cross-sectional 
predictions. First, we classify industries by labor intensity to test Hypothesis 2. Labor intensity is 
defined as the ratio of employees to capital investment. Industries with high ratios employ a large 
number of employees relative to their capital investment, but these employees are typically less 
important to the success of the firm. Typical industries with low labor intensity are “Oil and Gas 
Extraction” and “Petroleum Refining and Related Industries”; typical industries with high labor 
intensity are “Apparel and Accessory Stores” and “Eating and Drinking Places”. Columns (1) 
and (2) in Table 5 show the effect of labor mobility in two-digit SIC code industries with a labor 
intensity below the sample median; columns (3) and (4) in industries above the sample median. 
The results are presented in Table 5. We only find a significant and negative relation between 
labor mobility and accruals earnings management in low labor intensive industries where 
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employees are more important for the success of the firm. The difference in coefficients is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Finally, we classify firms according to their financial constraints. We expect workers at 
financially constrained firms to be more concerned about their firm’s future prospects as 
shortage of external funding can lead to financial distress. We measure financial constraints by 
the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, which measures how financially constrained a firm is 
based on several financial indicators. Firms with KZ index values above (below) the sample 
median are financially unconstrained (constrained). We present the results in Table 6. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In line with our prediction we only find a significant negative coefficient in the sub-
sample of financially constrained firms. This confirms our intuition that workers are more 
concerned about future prospects if they perceive their job security as risky and therefore firms 
will adjust their accruals earnings management policies accordingly. 
Second, we classify industries by product market competition. We define product market 
competition as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index value of sales concentration across two-digit 
SIC code industries following previous research. Industries with low concentration are 
competitive; industries with high concentration oligopolistic. The results are presented in Table 
7.  
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
We find that labor mobility is only related to accruals earnings management in 
competitive industries. Workers in competitive industries will be more concerned of the financial 
performance of their firm as the competitive nature of their product market interactions will 
make it hard to increase product prices or to obtain additional external funding. The difference in 
coefficients is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
4.2. Real earnings management 
A growing literature shows that firms not only manage earnings through accruals but also 
engage in distorting operating behavior to manage earnings. These distortions are aimed at 
improving financial performance in the short-run at the cost of worse financial performance in 
the long-run. We expect workers to dislike real earnings management activities as these worsen 
the firm’s long-term prospect and therefore the workers job security.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The results presented in Table 8 show that higher labor mobility is associated with lower 
real earnings management activities. Firms seem to lower expected worker turnover, and thus 
expected costs, by limiting their operating distortions to meet short time targets. 
4.3. Robustness 
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In this section we document a number of robustness tests that we performed to confirm 
the previous results.  
Earnings management proxies based on accruals are subject to measurement error. We 
therefore employ an alternative measure for firms’ earnings management activities that is not 
subject to this problem. More specifically, we collect information on firms’ restatement of 
financial statements from the AuditAnalytics database. We create an indicator variable 
Restatementi,t that takes the value of one if firm i restated its financial statements in year t and 
zero otherwise and estimate a Probit model with Restatement as the dependent variable. The 
results are shown in Table 9. 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
We find a significant negative coefficient on labor mobility, i.e. firms in industries with a 
more mobile workforce have less financial restatements confirming our findings in the previous 
section. 
In untabulated results we control for firm governance using the G-Index from Gompers et 
al. (2003), CEO equity incentives, institutional investor holdings and analyst coverage and find 
qualitatively similar results.    
4.4. Causality 
In the analysis so far, we provided evidence that firms operating in industries with mobile 
labor force are associated with less engagement in earnings management activities. However, the 
analysis so far suffers from potentially omitted variables, that are correlated with industry 
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characteristics as well as firm’s earnings management activities. To address these concerns, we 
conduct two additional analyses in order to confirm the causal interpretation of our results. As 
our measure of labor mobility is defined at the industry level we can’t rule out that unobserved 
industry characteristics drive our results. We therefore need to identify a change in labor 
mobility that is unrelated to industry characteristics and unlikely to affect firms accounting 
policies directly. 
In the first analysis we exploit changes in state-level taxes that affect workers mobility 
but are unlikely to be related with firm’s accrual earnings management activities. Many states in 
the US charge significant real estate transfer taxes on the value of the property or mortgage when 
private property is sold. Previous research in urban economics show that higher real estate 
transfer taxes are related to lower homeowner mobility. Given that real estate is a major part of 
individuals investment portfolio especially for average income workers, we expect that real 
estate taxes have a significant impact on individuals’ willingness to move to a different location. 
We therefore expect workers in states that increase (decrease) real estate transfer taxes to 
experience a reduction (increase) in labor mobility. However, as these taxes only apply to 
residential real estate it is unlikely that these tax changes affect firms in other way.  
We collect information on real estate taxes charged in US states from 1991-2013 from 
state legislators websites and other sources. We estimate a differences-in-differences model, i.e. 
we compare changes in earnings management activities between firms located in states which 
experience a change in real estate transfer taxes with those by firms located in states which do 
not experience a change in real estate taxes.4 For each firm affected by a state real estate transfer 
                                                 
4 Following previous research, we use information from Compustat on the location of a firms headquarter to proxy for 
a firm’s location. However, Compustat only records the most recent location of a firms headquarter. Additionally, 
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tax change we match an unaffected firm within the same two-digit SIC code that is closest in 
size.5,6 We then estimate the following differences-in-differences model using OLS: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where we include the control variables from equation (6) and add state level 
unemployment rate and state level GDP growth as additional controls. The latter two control 
variables are added to capture changes in state-level economic conditions. The coefficient 𝛽3 
captures the causal effect of changes in real estate taxes on a firm’s accrual-based earnings 
management. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
The results in Table 10 show that firms in affected states increase their accruals earnings 
management activities significantly after an increase in real estate transfer taxes compared to 
similar firms located in states without a tax change. 
                                                 
many firms will employ workers in states different from the state where their headquarters are located. Both caveats 
work against us in finding support of our hypothesis.  
5 By definition, accruals earnings management need to reverse. In a robustness test, we therefore match each treated 
firm with an untreated firm within the same two-digit SIC code and the closest value of abnormal accruals and find 
qualitatively similar results.  
6 We find qualitatively similar results if we only consider as control firms only firms that are located in states bordering 
the treatment firms state. Additionally, we find consistent results if we only use large tax changes, defined as above 
sample median tax changes, in the analysis. 
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In the second analysis we use state-level residential real estate prices to capture 
differences in workers willingness to locate to a different location. Prior literature in economics 
shows that homeowners are more likely to sell their homes if prices are high compared to the 
price when they bought their home. Crucially, homeowner’s willingness to sell their home 
depends not only on current prices but also on historical prices and less on contemporaneous 
price changes. Therefore, absolute house price indices, which compare current market values 
with historic prices, can proxy for workers mobility. Additionally, long-run house price 
movements vary remarkably across US states and are at least to some extent driven by 
exogenous supply level determinants (Saiz, 2010). Therefore, the residential state house price 
index level should be capturing homeowners’ willingness to sell their homes, and therefore their 
mobility, but shouldn’t be related to firm’s accrual earnings management decision as house price 
indices depend on historic developments. We, hence, use the state-level house price index as an 
alternative measure for workers mobility that varies across states and time.7 
We collect information on residential state-house price indices from the Federal Housing 
Financing Agency in the period of 1991-2013 and estimate the following model using OLS: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐻𝐹𝐴 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑖𝑔 4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜌𝑠 + 𝜏𝑗
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
                                                 
7 We implicitly assume that house owners bought their home at the point of index inception when using this approach. 
In a robustness test, we use the 10-year difference in state residential house price indices and find qualitatively similar 
results.  
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where 𝜏𝑗 are industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC code level and  𝜌𝑠 are state fixed 
effects. The results are shown in Table 11. 
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
The coefficient on the FHFA House Price index is negative and significant, indicating 
that home owner’s willingness to sell is associated with lower accruals earnings management. As 
in the previous analysis we control for contemporaneous state economic conditions as these 
might be correlated with firm’s earnings management activities.8 Overall, we find consistent 
evidence that firms consider their labor mobility in their earnings management decisions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Earnings management is associated with lower future performance (Barton and Simko 
2002; Hutton et al. 2009; Hribar and Jenkins 2004). In this study, we examine whether firms 
attempt to increase employees’ confidence in their future prospects and their ability to honor 
employment contracts by engaging in less earnings management. We focus on firms with a 
mobile labor force, as mobile employees have highly valuable outside options, increasing the 
likelihood of them leaving the firm and hence increasing the firm’s expected separation costs.  
We follow prior literature on labor economics and measure mobility at the occupation 
level, as the flexibility of an occupation to be employed in different industries (Grossman and 
                                                 
8 We find qualitatively similar results if we include industry-year interacted fixed effects controlling for time varying 
industry conditions. 
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Shapiro, 1982; Donangelo 2014). Our results are consistent with firms using financial reporting 
to reassure employees of their future prospects. Particularly labor mobility appears to be 
negatively related to earnings management for firms in labor intensive industries, firms close to 
financial distress, and firms operating in highly competitive product markets where the ability to 
attract and maintain employees is even more important. High labor force mobility is also 
negatively related to real earnings management. In additional analysis, we re-run our main 
analysis employing exogenous changes to labor mobility associated with the introduction of real 
estate transfer taxes in some states as well as differences in state-level residential real estate 
prices. Our conclusions remain unchanged. 
By showing that firms with highly mobile labor force decrease earnings management in 
an attempt to increase employees’ confidence on their ability to meet their obligations and hence 
decrease expected separation costs, our work extends prior accounting literature on earnings 
management as well as finance and economics literature examining the effects of labor mobility 
on corporate decisions. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable definitions: 
 
Discretionary Accruals Absolute value of abnormal accruals calculated from the modified 
Jones-model as described in Dechow et al. (1995). 
Real Earnings 
Management (REM1) 
Sum of abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative 
one and abnormal production costs (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
Real Earnings 
Management (REM2) 
Sum multiplied by negative one of abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). 
Mobility Standardized labor mobility in the industry defined at the three-
digit SIC code level (see Section 3.1. for details). 
Union Average unionization rate in the industry obtained from the Union 
Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS database. 
Labor Intensity Number of employees divided by property, plant and equipment 
defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
Employees Natural logarithm of the number of employees employed by the 
firm. 
High Skill Standardized skill level of employees (Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Industry Growth Annual percentage rate of growth in revenues defined at the two-
digit SIC code level. 
Age Natural logarithm of the number of years the firm appears on 
Compustat. 
Cash Flow Cash flow from operating activities. 
Big 4 Auditor Indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s financial statements 
are audited by one of the four largest audit firms and zero 
otherwise. 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
MTB Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. 
GDP Growth Annual percentage rate of growth in GDP defined at the state 
level. 
Unemployment Rate Annual percent rate of unemployment defined at the state level. 
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Table 1: Ranking by Labor Mobility (SOC/NAICS) 
 
Panel A: Five-digit SOC occupations 
 
Top 15 Occupations by Labor Mobility 
General and Operations Managers (11102) 
Production, Planning, and Expediting Clerks (43506) 
First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Production and Operating Workers (51101) 
Bookkeeping, Accounting, and Auditing Clerks (43303) 
Network Systems and Data Communications Analysts (15108) 
Shipping, Receiving, and Traffic Clerks (43507) 
Industrial Production Managers (11305) 
Office Clerks, General (43906) 
Inspectors, Testers, Sorters, Samplers, and Weighers (51906) 
Chief Executives (11101) 
Miscellaneous Sales Representatives, Services (41309) 
First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Office and Administrative Support Workers 
(43101) 
Miscellaneous Business Operations Specialists (13119) 
Payroll and Timekeeping Clerks (43305) 
Administrative Services Managers (11301) 
 
Bottom 15 Occupations by Labor Mobility 
Hotel, Motel, and Resort Desk Clerks (43408)  
Motion Picture Projectionists (39302) 
Dental Hygienists (29202) 
Pest Control Workers (37202) 
Shuttle Car Operators (53711) 
Tax Examiners, Collectors, Preparers, and Revenue Agents (13208) 
Barbers and Cosmetologists (39501) 
Secondary School Teachers (25203) 
Elementary and Middle School Teachers (25202) 
Transportation Attendants (39603) 
Postal Service Workers (43505) 
Animal Breeders (45202) 
Embalmers (39401) 
Postmasters and Mail Superintendents (11913) 
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Panel B: Four-digit NAICS industries 
 
Top 15 Industries by Labor Mobility 
Rubber Product Manufacturing (3262) 
Metal and Mineral (except Petroleum) Merchant Wholesalers (4235) 
Grocery and Related Product Merchant Wholesalers (4244)  
Clay Product and Refractory Manufacturing (3271) 
Dairy Product Manufacturing (3115) 
Beer, Wine, and Distilled Alcoholic Beverage Merchant Wholesalers (4248) 
Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills (3131) 
Other Furniture Related Product Manufacturing (3379) 
Other Food Manufacturing (3119) 
Animal Food Manufacturing (3111) 
Waste Collection (5621) 
Couriers and Express Delivery Services (4921) 
Seafood Product Preparation and Packaging (3117) 
Specialized Freight Trucking (4842) 
General Freight Trucking (4841) 
 
Bottom 15 Industries by Labor Mobility 
Offices of Dentists (6212) 
Elementary and Secondary Schools (6111) 
Scheduled Air Transportation (4811) 
Personal Care Services (8121) 
Logging (1133) 
Legal Services (5411) 
Rail Transportation (4821) 
Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools (6113) 
Junior Colleges (6112) 
Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (5419) 
Postal Service (4911) 
Building Equipment Contractors (4911) 
Offices of Physicians (6211) 
Agents and Managers for Artists, Athletes, Entertainers, and Other Public Figures 
(7114) 
Building Finishing Contractors (2383) 
 
 
This tables presents labor mobility rankings. Panel A ranking is based on five-digit SOC occupation 
codes; while Panel B ranking is based on four-digit NAICS codes. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
       
 
N Mean Median SD P25 P75 
Discretionary Accruals 75,490 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.03 0.17 
Real Earnings 
Management (REM1) 
68,575 -0.10 -0.07 0.61 -0.31 0.13 
Real Earnings 
Management (REM2) 
68,575 -0.06 -0.04 0.38 -0.19 0.08 
Mobility 75,490 0.00 -0.10 1.00 -0.90 0.76 
Union 75,490 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.13 
Labor Intensity 75,490 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.06 
Employees 75,490 1.19 0.74 1.22 0.22 1.82 
High Skill 75,490 0.41 0.40 0.19 0.26 0.53 
Size 75,490 5.78 5.60 2.16 4.16 7.23 
Industry Growth 75,490 0.16 0.11 2.30 0.05 0.19 
Age 75,490 2.54 2.48 0.81 1.95 3.18 
Cash Flow 75,490 0.27 0.02 0.91 0.00 0.12 
Big 4 Auditor 75,490 0.84 1.00 0.37 1.00 1.00 
Leverage 75,490 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.27 
MTB 75,490 3.14 2.02 3.64 1.25 3.49 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics. Discretionary Accruals is the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals calculated from the modified Jones-model as described in Dechow et al. (1995). Real 
Earnings Management (REM1) is the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by 
negative one and abnormal production costs. Real Earnings Management (REM2) is the sum 
multiplied by negative one of abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Mobility is standardized workflow mobility in the industry 
defined at three-digit SIC code level. Union is the average unionization rate in the industry 
obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS database. Labor 
Intensity is number of employees divided by property, plant and equipment. Employees is the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is standardized 
skill level of employees in the industry. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Industry 
Growth is the annual percentage growth in industry revenues defined at the two-digit SIC code 
level. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm appears on Compustat. Cash 
Flow is cash flow from operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firms’ financial statements are audited by one of the four largest audit firms and zero otherwise. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to 
book value of equity.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
                
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Discretionary Accruals [1] 1.00 
              
Real Earnings 
Management (REM1) [2] 
-0.01*** 1.00 
             
Real Earnings 
Management (REM2) [3] 
-0.04*** 0.91*** 1.00 
            
Mobility [4] 0.01** 0.06*** 0.08*** 1.00 
           
Union [5] -0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 1.00 
          
Labor Intensity [6] 0.16*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.03*** -0.20*** 1.00 
         
Employees [7] -0.12*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.18*** -0.06*** 1.00 
        
High Skill [8] -0.01 -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.45*** -0.19*** 0.03*** -0.23*** 1.00 
       
Size [9] -0.20*** 0.01*** -0.02*** -0.12*** 0.18*** -0.31*** 0.79*** -0.03*** 1.00 
      
Industry Growth [10] 0.02*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 1.00 
     
Age [11] -0.16*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.19*** -0.11*** 0.34*** -0.09*** 0.34*** -0.02*** 1.00 
    
Cash Flow [12] -0.09*** -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.06*** 0.09*** -0.15*** 0.56*** 0.05*** 0.56*** -0.01* 0.19*** 1.00 
   
Big 4 Auditor [13] -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.03*** 0.05*** -0.13*** 0.25*** -0.03*** 0.32*** -0.01** 0.01*** 0.11*** 1.00 
  
Leverage [14] -0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.02*** 0.21*** -0.22*** 0.20*** -0.18*** 0.31*** 0.00 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 1.00 
 
MTB [15] 0.15*** -0.20*** -0.20*** 0.02*** -0.11*** 0.03*** -0.06*** 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.00 -0.14*** 0.01** -0.01** 0.00 1.00 
 
This table reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Discretionary Accruals is the absolute value of abnormal accruals calculated from the modified Jones-model as described in Dechow et al. (1995). 
Real Earnings Management (REM1) is the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one and abnormal production costs. Real Earnings Management (REM2) is the sum multiplied 
by negative one of abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Mobility is standardized workflow mobility in the industry defined at three-
digit SIC code level. Union is the average unionization rate in the industry obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS database. Labor Intensity is number of employees 
divided by property, plant and equipment. Employees is the natural logarithm of the number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is standardized skill level of employees in the industry. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Industry Growth is the annual percentage growth in industry revenues defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the 
firm appears on Compustat. Cash Flow is cash flow from operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s financial statements are audited by one of the four largest 
audit firms and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: The Effect of Labor Mobility on Accruals Earnings 
Management 
   
 
(1) (2) 
 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Accruals 
Mobility 0.002 -0.005*** 
 (0.117) (0.000) 
Union  -0.098*** 
  (0.000) 
Labor Intensity  0.225*** 
  (0.000) 
Employees  0.009*** 
  (0.000) 
High Skill  -0.036*** 
  (0.000) 
Size  -0.014*** 
  (0.000) 
Industry Growth  0.002*** 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.014*** 
  (0.000) 
Cash Flow  0.001 
  (0.218) 
Big 4 Auditor  -0.003 
  (0.225) 
Leverage  -0.029*** 
  (0.000) 
MTB  0.005*** 
  (0.000) 
Constant 0.126*** 0.233*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
  
  
Observations 75,490 75,490 
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.093 
 
This table examines the effect of labor mobility on the level of discretionary 
accruals. The dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
calculated from the modified Jones-model as described in Dechow et al. 
(1995). Mobility is standardized workflow mobility in the industry defined at 
three-digit SIC code level. Union is the average unionization rate in the 
industry obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from 
the CPS database. Labor Intensity is number of employees divided by 
property, plant and equipment. Employees is the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is standardized skill 
level of employees in the industry. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
39 
 
assets. Industry Growth is the annual percentage growth in industry revenues 
defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years the firm appears on Compustat. Cash Flow is cash flow 
from operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm’s financial statements are audited by one of the four largest audit 
firms and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. 
All specifications include year fixed effects. p-values are reported in 
parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Labor Mobility on Earnings Management – Low vs High 
Labor Intensity 
     
 
Low Labor Intensity High Labor Intensity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Mobility 0.004*** -0.006*** 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.486) (0.380) 
Union  -0.008  -0.796*** 
  (0.203)  (0.000) 
High Skill  -0.051***  -0.046*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Size  -0.011***  -0.013*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Industry Growth  -0.004  -0.051*** 
  (0.437)  (0.000) 
Age  -0.006***  -0.021*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cash Flow  0.002***  0.006** 
  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Big 4 Auditor  -0.005  -0.010** 
  (0.167)  (0.031) 
Leverage  -0.047***  0.072*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MTB  0.004***  0.006*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.072*** 0.178*** 0.120*** 0.292*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 18,429 18,429 21,087 21,087 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.091 0.21 0.247 
 
This table examines the effect of labor mobility on the level of discretionary accruals separately for low and 
high labor intense firms. Low (high) labor intense firms are defined as firms with a ratio of number of 
employees to property, plant and equipment below (above) the sample median. The dependent variable is the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals calculated from the modified Jones-model as described in Dechow et al. 
(1995). Mobility is standardized workflow mobility in the industry defined at three-digit SIC code level. 
Union is the average unionization rate in the industry obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage 
Database from the CPS database. High Skill is standardized skill level of employees in the industry. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Industry Growth is the annual percentage growth in industry revenues 
defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm appears 
on Compustat. Cash Flow is cash flow from operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm’s financial statements are audited by one of the four largest audit firms and zero otherwise. 
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Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity. All specifications include year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. p-values are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Labor Mobility on Earnings Management – 
Unconstrained versus Constrained firms 
     
 
Unconstrained Firms Constrained Firms 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Mobility 0.006*** 0.000 -0.003** -0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.905) (0.044) (0.000) 
Union  -0.088***  -0.116*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Labor Intensity  0.463***  0.171*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Employees  0.007***  0.007*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.002) 
High Skill  0.016*  -0.064*** 
 
 (0.068)  (0.000) 
Size  -0.011***  -0.012*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Industry Growth 0.002***  -0.001 
 
 (0.000)  (0.794) 
Age  -0.015***  -0.014*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cash Flow  -0.000  0.001 
 
 (0.869)  (0.311) 
Big 4 Auditor  -0.001  -0.005 
 
 (0.88)  (0.177) 
Leverage  -0.065***  0.001 
 
 (0.000)  (0.901) 
MTB  0.006***  0.005*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.126*** 0.210*** 0.130*** 0.240*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
    
Observations 37,629 37,629 37,572 37,572 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.111 0.058 0.095 
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This table examines the effect of labor mobility on the level of discretionary accruals separately for 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Firms are classified as financially unconstrained 
(constrained) if the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index is above (below) the sample median. The 
dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal accruals calculated from the modified Jones-
model as described in Dechow et al. (1995). Mobility is standardized workflow mobility in the 
industry defined at three-digit SIC code level. Union is the average unionization rate in the industry 
obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS database. Labor 
Intensity is number of employees divided by property, plant and equipment. Employees is the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is standardized skill level of 
employees in the industry. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Industry Growth is the annual 
percentage growth in industry revenues defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the firm appears on Compustat. Cash Flow is cash flow from 
operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s financial 
statements are audited by one of the four largest audit firms and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio 
of long-term debt to total assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. 
All specifications include year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. p-
values are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: The Effect of Labor Mobility on Earnings Management – Low vs High 
Product Market Competition 
     
 Low Product Market Competition High Product Market Competition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Mobility 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.160) (0.612) (0.552) (0.000) 
Union  -0.064***  -0.106*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Labor Intensity  0.252***  0.220*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Employees  0.002  0.010*** 
  (0.553)  (0.000) 
High Skill  -0.044**  -0.017*** 
  (0.036)  (0.004) 
Size  -0.016***  -0.014*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Industry Growth  0.007  0.002*** 
  (0.225)  (0.000) 
Age  -0.012***  -0.014*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Cash Flow  0.022***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.718) 
Big 4 Auditor  -0.007  -0.002 
  (0.320)  (0.460) 
Leverage  -0.022  -0.031*** 
  (0.146)  (0.000) 
MTB  0.005***  0.005*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.159*** 0.270*** 0.120*** 0.221*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 11,047 11,047 64,443 64,443 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.069 0.047 0.108 
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This table examines the effect of labor mobility on the level of discretionary accruals separately for 
industries with low and high product market competition. Industries with low (high) product market 
competition are defined as industries with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index value of sales concentration 
above (below) the sample median. The dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
calculated from the modified Jones-model as described in Dechow et al. (1995). Mobility is 
standardized workflow mobility in the industry defined at three-digit SIC code level. Union is the 
average unionization rate in the industry obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage 
Database from the CPS database. Labor Intensity is number of employees divided by property, plant 
and equipment. Employees is the natural logarithm of the number of employees employed by the firm. 
High Skill is standardized skill level of employees in the industry. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. Industry Growth is the annual percentage growth in industry revenues defined at the two-digit 
SIC code level. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm appears on Compustat. 
Cash Flow is cash flow from operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm’s financial statements are audited by one of the four largest audit firms and zero otherwise. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to 
book value of equity. All specifications include year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. p-values are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: The Effect of Labor Mobility on Real Earnings Management 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Real Earnings  
Management  
(REM1) 
Real Earnings  
Management  
(REM1) 
Real Earnings  
Management  
(REM2) 
Real Earnings  
Management  
(REM2) 
Mobility 0.038*** -0.015*** 0.028*** -0.007** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.035) 
Union  0.350***  0.224*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Labor 
Intensity  0.780***  0.497*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Employees  0.036***  0.032*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
High Skill  -0.362***  -0.220*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size  -0.022***  -0.026*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Industry 
Growth  0.003  -0.004 
  (0.720)  (0.265) 
Age  0.066***  0.043*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cash Flow  -0.002  -0.004 
  (0.643)  (0.179) 
Big 4 Auditor  -0.137***  -0.076*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  0.384***  0.287*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MTB  -0.032***  -0.020*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant -0.083*** 0.007 -0.054*** 0.034* 
 (0.000) (0.832) (0.000) (0.097) 
      
Observations 63,331 63,331 63,331 63,331 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.105 0.006 0.121 
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This table examines the effect of labor mobility on the level of real earnings management. The 
dependent variable is a measure of real earnings management activities. Real Earnings Management 
(REM1) is the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one and abnormal 
production costs. Real Earnings Management (REM2) is the sum multiplied by negative one of 
abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010). The dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal accruals calculated from the modified 
Jones-model as described in Dechow et al. (1995). Mobility is standardized workflow mobility in the 
industry defined at three-digit SIC code level. Union is the average unionization rate in the industry 
obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from the CPS database. Labor Intensity 
is number of employees divided by property, plant and equipment. Employees is the natural logarithm 
of the number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is standardized skill level of employees 
in the industry. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Industry Growth is the annual percentage 
growth in industry revenues defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years the firm appears on Compustat. Cash Flow is cash flow from operating activities. Big 
4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s financial statements are audited by one of 
the four largest audit firms and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. All specifications include year fixed 
effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. p-values are reported in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
48 
 
Table 9: The Effect of Labor Mobility on Financial 
Statement Restatements 
   
 
(1) (2) 
 
Restatement Restatement 
Mobility -0.050** -0.057** 
 (0.021) (0.024) 
Union  -0.733*** 
  (0.001) 
Labor Intensity  -0.262 
  (0.438) 
Employees  0.058* 
  (0.094) 
High Skill  -0.069 
  (0.607) 
Size  0.075*** 
  (0.001) 
Industry Growth  -0.057 
  (0.338) 
Age  0.007 
  (0.820) 
Cash Flow  -0.179*** 
  (0.000) 
Big 4 Auditor  0.025 
  (0.649) 
Leverage  -0.183 
  (0.170) 
MTB  0.014*** 
  (0.003) 
Constant -2.571*** -2.962*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
  
  
Observations 54,512 54,512 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.113 
 
This table examines the effect of labor mobility on the occurrence of 
financial statements restatements. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the firm restated its financial statement for 
the fiscal-year and zero otherwise. The model is estimated using a probit 
specification. Mobility is standardized workflow mobility in the industry 
defined at three-digit SIC code level. Union is the average unionization rate 
in the industry obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage 
Database from the CPS database. Labor Intensity is number of employees 
divided by property, plant and equipment. Employees is the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is 
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standardized skill level of employees in the industry. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Industry Growth is the annual percentage growth in 
industry revenues defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the firm appears on Compustat. Cash Flow 
is cash flow from operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm’s financial statements are audited by one of the four 
largest audit firms and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity. All specifications include year fixed effects. p-values are reported 
in parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10: The Effect on Accruals Earnings Management of 
an Exogenous Shock on Labor Mobility 
   
 
(1) (2) 
 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Treatment 0.005 0.003 
 (0.335) (0.568) 
Post -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.628) (0.240) 
Treatment # Post 0.008** 0.008*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Union  -0.098*** 
  (0.000) 
Labor Intensity  0.170*** 
  (0.000) 
Employees  0.013*** 
  (0.010) 
High Skill  -0.081*** 
  (0.000) 
Size  -0.014*** 
  (0.000) 
Industry Growth  -0.006*** 
  (0.007) 
Age  -0.010*** 
  (0.007) 
Cash Flow  -0.001 
  (0.786) 
Big 4 Auditor  0.012** 
  (0.034) 
Leverage  -0.043*** 
  (0.008) 
MTB  0.007*** 
  (0.000) 
GDP Growth  0.001 
  (0.626) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.000 
  (0.947) 
Constant 0.128*** 0.224*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Observations 8,076 8,076 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.080 
 
This table examines the effect of changes in state-level real estate transfer 
taxes on the level of discretionary accruals. The dependent variable is the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals calculated from the modified Jones-model 
as described in Dechow et al. (1995). Treatment is an indicator variable equal 
to one (negative one) if the firm is headquartered in a state that raises (reduces) 
real estate transfer taxes and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable equal 
to one in the year the real estate tax changed and zero otherwise. Union is the 
average unionization rate in the industry obtained from the Union Membership 
and Coverage Database from the CPS database. Labor Intensity is number of 
employees divided by property, plant and equipment. Employees is the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is 
standardized skill level of employees in the industry. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Industry Growth is the annual percentage growth in 
industry revenues defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years the firm appears on Compustat. Cash Flow is 
cash flow from operating activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm’s financial statements are audited by one of the four 
largest audit firms and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. GDP Growth is the annual growth in GDP at the state level. 
Unemployment Rate is the annual employment rate at the state level. p-values 
are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 11: State House Price Levels and Accruals Earnings 
Management 
   
 
(1) (2) 
 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
FHFA House Price 
Index -0.005** -0.009*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) 
Union  -0.027** 
  (0.020) 
Labor Intensity  0.115*** 
  (0.000) 
Employees  0.014*** 
  (0.000) 
High Skill  -0.034*** 
  (0.000) 
Size  -0.016*** 
  (0.000) 
Industry Growth  -0.006*** 
  (0.000) 
Age  -0.014*** 
  (0.000) 
Cash Flow  0.003** 
  (0.019) 
Big 4 Auditor  -0.003 
  (0.293) 
Leverage  -0.033*** 
  (0.000) 
MTB  0.006*** 
  (0.000) 
GDP Growth  0.001*** 
  (0.009) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.002* 
  (0.074) 
Constant 0.163*** 0.222*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
  
  
Observations 77,719 65,626 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.138 
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This table examines the effect of state house price levels on accruals earnings 
management. The dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals calculated from the modified Jones-model as described in Dechow et 
al. (1995). FHFA House Price Index is the current residential house price 
index level at the state level Union is the average unionization rate in the 
industry obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from 
the CPS database. Labor Intensity is number of employees divided by 
property, plant and equipment. Employees is the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees employed by the firm. High Skill is standardized skill 
level of employees in the industry. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Industry Growth is the annual percentage growth in industry revenues defined 
at the two-digit SIC code level. Age is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years the firm appears on Compustat. Cash Flow is cash flow from operating 
activities. Big 4 Auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if the firms’ 
financial statements are audited by one of the four largest audit firms and zero 
otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MTB is the 
ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. GDP Growth is the 
annual growth in GDP at the state level. Unemployment Rate is the annual 
employment rate at the state level. p-values are reported in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
